Is there such a thing as "Objective Value"?

[Peregrinus]

Yes. "Moral relativism" is usually a shorthand term for the view that this thread exists to debate; are their any objective moral values? A moral relativist will argue that (1) there are no absolute rules to determine whether something is right or wrong, and (2) what we consider right or wrong depends on opinion, social context, culture, etc.

It is, of course, possible to accept point (2) while not accepting point (1) — our views on what is right and wrong are always subjective and are shaped and constrained by our experience, culture, etc, but we can still say that there are objective standards of right and wrong, and our subjective opinions are an attempt to approach those standards, and can be nearer to or further from those standards.

This isn't just a religious view, though of course it is foundational for most religious ethical systems. But the whole notion of moral progress - seeing our tolerance as an advance over previous generations judgmentalism, or seeing our democracy as an advance over absolute monarchy, etc - implicitly evaluates moral developments in terms of a desired or ideal end-goal.

[knownunknown]

Isn't the notion of morale progress just a smokescreen for introducing objectivity in morality? I mean the idea of progress infers that the newest iteration is better than the last. Who can make that judgement?

There are still tribes hell bent on destroying other tribes all over the world, and if they succeeded this would be called genocide. From their point of view though they are increasing their population potential for their family/tribe/society/civilization. Not a perspective I would agree with mind you, but who am I to say they are wrong, and what argument can I appeal to?

[Memento Mori]

Isn't the notion of morale progress just a smokescreen for introducing objectivity in morality? I mean the idea of progress infers that the newest iteration is better than the last. Who can make that judgement?

There are still tribes hell bent on destroying other tribes all over the world, and if they succeeded this would be called genocide. From their point of view though they are increasing their population potential for their family/tribe/society/civilization. Not a perspective I would agree with mind you, but who am I to say they are wrong, and what argument can I appeal to?

Well, this is the point really. Without any objective truth to point to, all you have to go on, ultimately, is "because I say so" and perhaps a big stick. Things will get messy.

[knownunknown]

Well, this is the point really. Without any objective truth to point to, all you have to go on, ultimately, is "because I say so" and perhaps a big stick. Things will get messy.

I agree that objective true and false exist; just not objective right and wrong. What objective truth would you point to?

[Memento Mori]

I agree that objective true and false exist; just not objective right and wrong. What objective truth would you point to?

Why do you believe in one, and not the other?

It is perfectly coherent that I, or anyone else, could articulate something we believe to be an objective truth, and in time it is discovered that it was not, as our knowledge and understanding increase (it is also possible that we could say something is not an objective truth and in time discover this was wrong and it in fact is). So I am not sure if engaging in a debate over whether a particular statement is objectively true or not, even if we could arrive at a mutually agreed conclusion, would actually address the fundamental issue of whether there is such a thing as objective truth.

[knownunknown]

Why do you believe in one, and not the other?

Because they can be proven or have stood the test of time not being disproven. Falsifiability is pretty important to me. If it's impossible to prove something incorrect how can you ever say it is true?

Einstein's theory of relativity came along but didn't negate how true Newton's theory of gravity was. It just improved it with an even deeper understanding.

[Peregrinus]

Bit of a category error here, I think. The whole point about something being objectively true is that it is true regardless of whether we know it, or believe it, or test it, or prove it, or anything. So “you can’t point to an objective truth!” does nothing to refute the notion that objective truth may exist.

“You can’t falsify it” is also not much of a rebuttal. The scientific method depends on falsifiability, but falsifiability depends on empirical evidence, and so the scientific method can only be employed to evaluate propositions about empirically observable things. So it cannot be employed to evaluate a proposition about something which is not empirically observable, like an ethical or other philosophical proposition. But while “we cannot test this proposition using the scientific method” may tell us something about how much certainty we can have as to the truth of the proposition, it tells us nothing at all about the objective truth or falsehood of the proposition.

Rather than deny the existence of objective ethical values, you might reasonably ask “what use are objective ethical values, if we cannot know what they are? Why should I care whether they exist or not, if they are inaccessible to me?”

This is a serious challenge which needs to be engaged with; are discussions about objective moral truths the modern equivalent of debates about angels dancing on the head of a pin - meaningless in terms of human experience and human ethical problems?

Some people - I may be looking at you, 2u2me - privilege the scientific method as the best or only method of establishing objective truth. If a proposition can’t be empirically tested, then it is irrelevant to us that it may be objectively true, because we can never know that it is objectively true. But, as already pointed out, there is a limited range of questions that can be investigated with the scientific method, and ethical questions are not among them. In the real world, though, we are constantly faced with ethical questions and we do have to investigate them, and we have developed techniques for doing so. I don’t think you can dismiss these techniques simply because they are not the scientific method, or because they do not always yield answers attended with the high degree of certainty that the scientific method can offer.

Although we like to think of the scientific method as delivering answers that are proven to be objectively true, strictly speaking it doesn’t. The scientific method depends on a number of unproven (and unprovable) axioms. Only if you accept those axioms without proof can you place any confidence in the findings of science. Similarly the (non-scientific) proofs offered in Euclidean geometry are only valid in so far as the axioms on which they rest are valid, and the axioms are unproven and unprovable.

There’s a common thread here. All epistemologies - all the ways in which we come to know things - depend on unproven axioms. And the methods by which we might seek to come to know objective moral truths will likewise depend on unproven axioms.

A classic platonist approach to the problem will argue that we can attempt to discern objective moral truths by using reason to reflect on nature. You could start, for example, with the axiom that human growth and flourishing, realising human potential, both individual/personal and collective/community, is good, and then use reason to reflect on our experience and understanding of human nature and the nature of the world we live in to identify ethical values which will contribute to human growth and flourishing. This isn’t a thousand miles away from the scientific method, which in reliance on the axioms that underpin the scientific method uses observation and reason to infer knowledge of the nature of the world around us.

[Peregrinus]

Isn't the notion of morale progress just a smokescreen for introducing objectivity in morality? I mean the idea of progress infers that the newest iteration is better than the last. Who can make that judgement?

Interestingly, I think the notion of moral progress started off as a challenge to religion - in particular, to Christianity, which holds that we are all Fallen, subject to total depravity, and that we cannot save or redeem ourselves, and only divine intervention (specifically, the sacrifice of Christ) can overcome the effects of the Fall. From the enlightenment onwards people argued against this view of human nature by pointing to an arc of moral progress - the rise and flourishing of civilisation, growth in prosperity, improvements in education, health and welfare, the transition from tyranny to democracy and the rule of law, etc. Not only can we save ourselves from depravity, the argument runs, but we are, slowly and steadily, doing so.

I don't think this was a "smokescreen for introducing objectivity in morality". The notion that there are objective moral standards was already pretty well-established, and I think the moral progressivists wanted to assert that their could be objective moral standards even without a god to decree what they were. If pressed, they would probably have pointed to standards derived from an observation of nature, as outlined in my post above. (That classic enlightenment document, the US Declaration of Independence, famously asserts a number of moral values — e.g. the right to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness — and proclaims that "we hold these things to be self-evident"; i.e. you only have to look at them to see that they are true.)

The whole notion of an inexorable arc of history bending towards objective moral standards was very optimistic, and I think very smug. (The spread of European empires, bringing civilisation to the uncivilised, was seen at the time as an example of this moral progress.) It took a bit of a battering in the trenches of 1914-18, and then a further battering in Auschwitz, and yet again in Hiroshima. By the end of the 1950s, we were living in a world in which two superpowers had the capacity to destroy all life on the planet, and both proclaimed the intention to do so rather than lose an argument over, essentially, the optimal way of organising a national economy. In moral terms, that was plainly insane. After that, you could still argue that objective moral standards could exist, but it was much harder to argue that we always or inevitably move towards them. And it's in response to that that I think we see the rise of moral relativism.

There are still tribes hell bent on destroying other tribes all over the world, and if they succeeded this would be called genocide. From their point of view though they are increasing their population potential for their family/tribe/society/civilization. Not a perspective I would agree with mind you, but who am I to say they are wrong, and what argument can I appeal to?

You can point out that their preference for the welfare or benefit of their own family/tribe/society/civilization is completely understandable but also completely subjective and, rationally, will not be shared by other families/tribes/societies/civilizations. If you're a moral absolutist you can suggest to them that, rationally, a moral standard which attaches equal weight to the welfare and benefit of all families/tribes/societies/civilizations intuitively likely to be closer to the objectively valid moral standard. If you're a moral relativist, though, I think you're in a sticky position.

Faced with this dilemma or any of the many variants on it, moral relativists will generally argue for an ethic of tolerance. Precisely because your moral view has no greater objective validity than mine and vice versa, the argument runs, we must foster a culture in which competing moral views are tolerated and are accorded the same respect as one another. But of course to say that we ought to tolerate/respect competing moral views is itself a moral proposition; how can we justify demanding that others respect that proposition? You might attempt to justify it with the utilitarian argument that if we all accept an obligation to respect one another's views, fewer of us will kill one another and more of us will be happy, but even that assumes that fewer deaths and more happiness are both ethical goods. And so on; it's moral values all the way down.

So I think that if you try to make moral relativism functional or viable in the real world you keep backing yourself into a corner in which you have to assert or assume that something has an absolute moral value that everyone ought to accept and, to the extent that they don't, they are wrong.

[CelticRambler]

Here's an interesting spanner to poke into these particular works:



The video covers several aspects of primate/great-ape behaviour, but in the context of this thread it's most interesting to see the presentation of certain behaviours in chimps and bonobos, that we would normally associate with the kind of "moral" values that we reserve to our own species.

[Memento Mori]

This topic is one which I feel is one of the key questions society needs to engage with. I have yet to get a coherent explanation from someone who;

(i) Objects to objective value
and
(ii) Holds strong/opposing views on "moral" issues (usually abortion, assisted suicide etc.)

as to why their position is absolutely morally correct, and those who disagree are wrong, and should be the standard for society. When it is pointed out that they have rejected the idea of something being "absolutely" correct, usually the discussion circles around gestures to majority opinion and democracy. But when it is put bluntly to them that they are saying that if a majority at a given moment in time think something is morally good then it actually is, thus you have no basis to later say otherwise just because the majority may then think differently, that point is rarely accepted. It essentially boils down to their moral basis for their arguments and actions "I think I am right even though I admit I cannot, by definition, be objectively correct" and if enough other people think the same then there is a big enough stick to impose it upon society.

This will not lead to peaceful times.

[Peregrinus]

But even if we accept that there are objective moral values, don’t we still face (a variant on) this problem? How are we to know what the objective moral truth is, given that (a) we don’t already agree about it, and (b) there can be no proof?

Is there much difference, in practice, between . . .

“I think I am right even though I admit I cannot, by definition, be objectively correct”

and . . .

“I think I am objectively right even though I cannot prove it”?

If I can’t prove I’m objectively right then, obviously, you are free to believe that I am not objectively right and that you are, or that neither of us is objectively right because you don’t accept the concept of “objectively right”.

Even if I agree with you that objective right exists, I don't have to agree with you about what is the objectively right answer to any ethical question. And we’re back in a discussion as to how, in this situation, we make shared moral decisions without shared agreement on what is objectively right. And the discussion inevitably gravitates towards majority opinion and democracy.

No?

[knownunknown]

This topic is one which I feel is one of the key questions society needs to engage with. I have yet to get a coherent explanation from someone who;

(i) Objects to objective value
and
(ii) Holds strong/opposing views on "moral" issues (usually abortion, assisted suicide etc.)

as to why their position is absolutely morally correct, and those who disagree are wrong, and should be the standard for society. When it is pointed out that they have rejected the idea of something being "absolutely" correct, usually the discussion circles around gestures to majority opinion and democracy.But when it is put bluntly to them that they are saying that if a majority at a given moment in time think something is morally good then it actually is, thus you have no basis to later say otherwise just because the majority may then think differently, that point is rarely accepted. It essentially boils down to their moral basis for their arguments and actions "I think I am right even though I admit I cannot, by definition, be objectively correct" and if enough other people think the same then there is a big enough stick to impose it upon society.

This will not lead to peaceful times.

Who objects to objective value(truth)? The post-modernists are the only ones I know of.

Once postmodernists had repudiated truth, objectivity, reason, reality et al, they were left in a vacuum with no way to proceed - so they defaulted to their former philosophy, Marxism, in order to orientate their morality and action. They discovered there was one thing left: power, and deduced one moral precept: destroy those that have power, regardless of the nature of their power, how they got it and use it and keep it.

[isha]

And the discussion inevitably gravitates towards majority opinion and democracy.

No?

Many wise people from Plato onwards have spoken of democracies wound, the tyranny of the majority. Democracy, properly envisioned, must be able to protect minority opinions. In recent times I see this tyranny of the majority manifest more and more, with unseen algorithms shaped and deployed to its service. The slightly older material about propaganda from people like Bernays, Orwell, McLuhan etc is very relevant to this time of supposedly democratic populations swiming in media and simultaneously anaesthetised by desire, pleasure and sensation.

[Peregrinus]

Who objects to objective value(truth)? The post-modernists are the only ones I know of.

Once postmodernists had repudiated truth, objectivity, reason, reality et al, they were left in a vacuum with no way to proceed - so they defaulted to their former philosophy, Marxism, in order to orientate their morality and action. They discovered there was one thing left: power, and deduced one moral precept: destroy those that have power, regardless of the nature of their power, how they got it and use it and keep it.

Oh, Lord, no. If you think that objections to moral objectivism started with the post-modernists, you haven't been paying attention. Ethical subjectivism in one form or another has been round since forever. In no particular order, we've got:

John Stuart Mill, who advocated ethical utilitarianism; the principle that the morally right choice is the one which s likely to produce the most happiness overall. Happiness is of course a subjective experience, so for Mill the defining test of morality is always a subjective one (even if it's not the actor's own subjective view).

David Hume, who suggest that the test for whether a character trait is a moral virtue is "would it be approved of by an informed, sympathetic and rational person?"

And there are much older examples going back to some of the Greek philosophical schools, including Stoicism and Epicureanism, which argue from the precept that the goal of life is to attain happiness/contentment/"good spirit", and the ethical choice is always the one which promotes this goal. Again, this means that the ultimate measure of ethics is a subjective experience.

Of course, there were contrary views; Kant, for example. But Kant had to argue the morally objectivist case that he did precisely because it wasn't already universally accepted. This tension between subjectivist and objectivist views of morality goes way back. If you think this started with postmodernism, or even that nowadays it is mainly exemplified in postmodernism, I can't agree.

In fact postmodern ethics isn't particularly relativist. As might be expected, it's all over the shop, with many postmodernist simply denying the possibility of making ethical choices at all/arguing that ethical choices are illusory.

[Peregrinus]

Many wise people from Plato onwards have spoken of democracies wound, the tyranny of the majority. Democracy, properly envisioned, must be able to protect minority opinions. In recent times I see this tyranny of the majority manifest more and more, with unseen algorithms shaped and deployed to its service. The slightly older material about propaganda from people like Bernays, Orwell, McLuhan etc is very relevant to this time of supposedly democratic populations swiming in media and simultaneously anaesthetised by desire, pleasure and sensation.

Yup. Once possible response to the problem of how to make shared moral choices is to question the need for doing so in the first place. Liberalism argues that, since we may legitimately come to different moral conclusions, we should avoid conflict by allowing people to act differently according to their moral views, rather than requiring them to act collectively according to a shared moral view. And liberal democracy argues for a democracy that treats this as a foundational value; if if it's not necessary to make people act collectively, then it's necessary not to make them do so, and to allow each person to act as they wish.

But this only takes you so far, because often is is necessary that we should act collectively. Humans are social animals; it's essential to our nature that we live and act with others; and therefore we must often act collectively, not individually. And, even when we act individually, we have to recognise the extent to which our actions may impact on others, and therefore we must accept some ethical responsibility for the effect of our actions on others, and that they may have some right to limit or constrain our choices so as to protect their own interests. And the more socially integrated our lives become, the truer this is. So liberalism may help to confine or limit this dilemma, but it certainly can't remove it.

[isha]

I will come back when I have time Peregrinus, but just preliminary thought is that while some historical examples of us acting collectively may be said hopefully universally to be good, like communal sanitation, freeing slaves, promoting science, it is undoubtedly true that quite a number of our collective actions have been downright dreadful, like wars, gulags, victimising scapegoats, medical experiments, and yet these were usually accepted/acquiesced to by majorities. So I am not even sure we can accept that the necessity to act collectively is on the face of it a universal good.

[Memento Mori]

But even if we accept that there are objective moral values, don’t we still face (a variant on) this problem? How are we to know what the objective moral truth is, given that (a) we don’t already agree about it, and (b) there can be no proof?

Is there much difference, in practice, between . . .

“I think I am right even though I admit I cannot, by definition, be objectively correct”

and . . .

“I think I am objectively right even though I cannot prove it”?

If I can’t prove I’m objectively right then, obviously, you are free to believe that I am not objectively right and that you are, or that neither of us is objectively right because you don’t accept the concept of “objectively right”.

Even if I agree with you that objective right exists, I don't have to agree with you about what is the objectively right answer to any ethical question. And we’re back in a discussion as to how, in this situation, we make shared moral decisions without shared agreement on what is objectively right. And the discussion inevitably gravitates towards majority opinion and democracy.

No?

This is the core of the matter - there is a massive difference. If your fundamental position is that you, or anyone else, cannot be objectively correct, and thus any position is just as "valid", what basis do you have to impose, or seek to impose, your view upon others through laws and such?

If you honestly believe that your position is objectively right, and I do mine, then there is a clear basis for us to disagree and argue our respective positions with reference to whatever arguments we care to make. We can say that society and laws etc. should run in accordance with our view, as it is the objectively correct one, with the other being "wrong". Perhaps one of us could be persuaded as to the merits of the other's argument (stranger things have happened!)

Say, for example, we agree that mathematics can have objectively correct answers and we are discussing what the answer to 2+2 is, the solution to which will have profound effects on society. Let us say you think 2+2=3 and I think it equals 5. We argue back and forth but underpinning our discussion is the idea that there is a right answer even if we cannot 'definitively' prove it. We are both of the mind that our own respective answers are correct. Within the space of an argument with this foundation, there is room for new ideas, arguments etc. and the hope and expectation that humanity may arrive eventually at a correct answer. Our discussion and argument, even if we are wrong, is a noble endeavor in search of truth. Should one of our arguments "carry the day" and thus profoundly affect society, it is done so on the basis of the belief, even if it is actually wrong, that it is objectively correct. So if the textbooks say 2+2=5 it is because this is something which is believed, by some at least, to be objectively true - this appeal to objective truth is the basis for any justification that others should be bound by it. Should someone come along with a better argument (regardless of whether their answer is correct) the previous answer may be discarded, temporarily at least, as having been wrong.

Let us say however that a third party interrupts our discussion and says that not only can we not prove what the solution to 2+2 is, but that by definition it does not have an objective answer. The implication of this being that all answers are equal (or pointless). He then goes further and forcefully states that the answer should be 55 and insists this is the answer others accept being imposed upon them. He cannot say it is because he believes it to be objectively true. He is saying that just because he thinks it should be 55, even though he knows this cannot be objectively true and in fact there is no answer, people should go along with it. This is tyranny, a whim.

In practice though, many people who deny objective truth basically act as if there were such a thing and make extremely forceful moral arguments in favour of their position, and often accept such concepts as intrinsic human rights, even though these are incompatible with their denial of objective value. This is a fundamental contradiction that needs to be addressed or it could destroy western civilization, and I don't say that lightly. Truth is replaced with ideology, the answer to these serious issues is simply given and justified based upon the phrase "because I say so" and imposed accordingly. You can never find truth if you deny it exists.

So to come back to your point; “I think I am right even though I admit I cannot, by definition, be objectively correct”. This statement falls under its own weight. How can you think you are right if you say there is no correct answer? Essentially the position is this: "I like this idea, so even though it is not objectively true as objective truth does not exist, I will act as if it is and argue that others should submit to it".

[Memento Mori]

For what it is worth, I think one of the reasons why people act, in practice, as if objective truth exists even when they deny it, is because it actually does exist.

[knownunknown]

For what it is worth, I think one of the reasons why people act, in practice, as if objective truth exists even when they deny it, is because it actually does exist.

Which people are you talking about?

[Memento Mori]

Which people are you talking about?

People who do not believe in objective values. There are lots of them and they very much have the upper hand in the zeitgeist in the West. It is central to a considerable number of ideologies that people espouse. The thing with ideologies of course is that people tend to take them based on what they advocate, rather than their foundational principles - so you have lots of Marxists and socialists who like the whole power to the people, not letting capitalists steal the surplus value the worker creates stuff and take the whole ideology as a package and don't ever really examine the foundations.

[Memento Mori]

Really good posts by the way, I'm very glad I bumped this thread.

[knownunknown]

People who do not believe in objective values. There are lots of them and they very much have the upper hand in the zeitgeist in the West. It is central to a considerable number of ideologies that people espouse. The thing with ideologies of course is that people tend to take them based on what they advocate, rather than their foundational principles - so you have lots of Marxists and socialists who like the whole power to the people, not letting capitalists steal the surplus value the worker creates stuff and take the whole ideology as a package and don't ever really examine the foundations.

I'm a little confused because earlier you said objective truths and now you're saying objective values (which I interpret as objective morale value- the same way the speaker in the OP used objective values).

If you're talking about people that don't believe in objective truths I'm with you. E.g. the ones that say the categories of male and female are inventions, or that you can just change your sex.

I think most people these days believe that morality is subjective, apart from the religious.

[Peregrinus]

I will come back when I have time Peregrinus, but just preliminary thought is that while some historical examples of us acting collectively may be said hopefully universally to be good, like communal sanitation, freeing slaves, promoting science, it is undoubtedly true that quite a number of our collective actions have been downright dreadful, like wars, gulags, victimising scapegoats, medical experiments, and yet these were usually accepted/acquiesced to by majorities. So I am not even sure we can accept that the necessity to act collectively is on the face of it a universal good.

That's a different point from the one I was trying to make. My point is that there are a lot of things that we can only do collectively. Should we have the institution of private property? Should we have a king or an elected government? These are decisions that can only be made collectively. And there are other decisions that can, in practice, only be made effectively if made collectively. Shall we build a road from A to B?

It doesn't matter what the ethically better answer to any of these question is. Whether we are going to answer well or answer badly, we must answer together.

So I'm not saying that making decisions collectively tends to make for ethically better decisions; just that there are a whole range of ethical questions that we can only make collectively. You think contraception is fine and I think it's morally objectionable; we can each act as we (and our partners) wish on that question. But you think maternity hospitals are good and I do not; we need to make a shared decision about whether to provide a maternity hospital. And therefore we must find a way of making shared ethical decisions when we are not in agreement.

[Memento Mori]

I'm a little confused because earlier you said objective truths and now you're saying objective values (which I interpret as objective morale value- the same way the speaker in the OP used objective values).

If you're talking about people that don't believe in objective truths I'm with you. E.g. the ones that say the categories of male and female are inventions, or that you can just change your sex.

I think most people these days believe that morality is subjective, apart from the religious.

If something can be "objectively true" regarding something man has 'apparently' conceived, be it the beauty of art, mathematics, gender etc. why not morality?

"Objective value" is not limited to morality.

Au contraire, many people say that they believe morality is subjective, but then put forward moral positions as if they were objective - see the whole concept of human rights.

[Memento Mori]

That's a different point from the one I was trying to make. My point is that there are a lot of things that we can only do collectively. Should we have the institution of private property? Should we have a king or an elected government? These are decisions that can only be made collectively. And there are other decisions that can, in practice, only be made effectively if made collectively. Shall we build a road from A to B?

It doesn't matter what the ethically better answer to any of these question is. Whether we are going to answer well or answer badly, we must answer together.

So I'm not saying that making decisions collectively tends to make for ethically better decisions; just that there are a whole range of ethical questions that we can only make collectively. You think contraception is fine and I think it's morally objectionable; we can each act as we (and our partners) wish on that question. But you think maternity hospitals are good and I do not; we need to make a shared decision about whether to provide a maternity hospital. And therefore we must find a way of making shared ethical decisions when we are not in agreement.

The traditional position would be that these decisions are made with reference to the natural law, and hence there are "no-go" areas as they are simply wrong. If the Irish people voted to exterminate the traveller community I am sure we here would say that this "ethical decision" position is wrong and thus invalid.

So I guess the question is this, how can we make collective moral and ethical decisions if we are not all playing by the same rulebook?